Evidence for Inferential Isolation
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Notes
The recording is from a rough rehearsal to check the timing. Some updates to slides and script happened after that.
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Vertical Motion
The trajectories implied by representational momentum reveal that the effect reflects impetus mechanics rather than Newtonian principles (Freyd & Jones, 1994; Kozhevnikov & Hegarty, 2001; Hubbard, Blessum, & Ruppel, 2001; Hubbard, 2013). And these trajectories are independent of subjects' scientific knowledge (Freyd & Jones, 1994; Kozhevnikov & Hegarty, 2001). Representational momentum therefore reflects judgement-independent expectations about objects’ movements which track momentum in accordance with a principle of impetus.% [^1]
References
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Hubbard, T. L. (2013). Launching, Entraining, and Representational Momentum: Evidence Consistent with an Impetus Heuristic in Perception of Causality. Axiomathes, 23(4), 633–643. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-012-9186-z
Hubbard, T. L., Blessum, J. A., & Ruppel, S. E. (2001). Representational momentum and Michotte’s “launching effect” paradigm (1946/1963). Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 27(1), 294–301. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.27.1.294
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