Norm-like Patterns in Joint Action: A dual-process theory

Date given: Tuesday, 6th June 2023

Notes

These are the notes for a talk with John Michael based on some work-in-progress.

Abstract

Joint action in humans and other animals involves various patterns of behaviour which appear to accord with norms. To illustrate, humans will often match the effort they put in to the effort a partner contributes (Székely & Michael, 2023), and dogs will perform play bows which encourage others to drop their guard (Bekoff, 2001). These norm-like patterns facilitate successful joint action. But what is going on psychologically and normatively? The main philosophical tools available are joint commitment (Gilbert, 2013) and reliance (Scanlon, 1998; Bratman, 2006). Neither seems sufficient for understanding psychological and normative aspects of norm-like patterns, or so we will argue. Instead we offer a novel conjecture with two parts. First, norm-like patterns in joint action are a consequence of fast, cognitively undemanding processes that are liable to produce behaviours in conflict with reasoned judgements about norms. Second, these fast processes are identical to those postulated by dual-process theories of ethical cognition (Greene, 2015). This conjecture generates predictions. We should be able to construct cases in which people follow norm-like patterns while denying that any corresponding norm applies. And their tendency to follow norm-like patterns should be modulated by factors that have been shown to modulate fast ethical processes, including cognitive load, disgust and bitterness. If correct, the norm-like conjecture may contribute to characterising aspects of joint action that are shared with other species, and to illuminating the origins of aspects which are unique among humans.

Norm-like Patterns

Norm-Like Patterns are patterns in behaviour that conform to principles, upheld (in part) by cost-imposing responses to violations, where conformity matters for solving a coordination problem these agents or their ancestors faced.

Norm-like patterns are widespread in humans and many other animals.

Why are norm-like patterns not norms? Because the principles need not be true, nor would the agents necessarily endorse them. And they may not be currently appropriate.^[1]

The existence of norm-like patterns raises two questions:

1. What, if any, normative notions are needed to characterise norm-like patterns?

2. What are the psychological mechanisms underpinning them?

Joint Commitment and Reliance

The notion of joint commitment is nicely illustrated by a famous example:

‘If they are walking together, both Andrea herself and Heinrich will have the understandings [that]: by virtue of their walking together Andrea has a right to Heinrich’s continued walking alongside her, together with the standing to issue related rebukes and demands.’ (Gilbert, 2013, p. 25)

Could norm-like patterns reflect joint commitments in Gilbert’s sense?

The existence of joint commitments could explain how some norm-like patterns are upheld. But this cannot be the whole story because dogs and other nonhuman animals are unlikely to have the understandings required for joint commitment.

Michael & Butterfill (2022) offer a complementary problem for joint commitment.

A hint about the notion of reliance is contained in Principle M:

‘Principle M: [...] it is not permissible for one person, A, in order to get another person, B, to do some act, X [...], to lead B to expect that if he or she does X then A will do Y [...] when in fact A has no intention of doing Y if B does X, and A can reasonably foresee that B will suffer significant loss if he or she does X and A does not reciprocate by doing Y.’ (Scanlon, 1998, p. 298)

This principle could also explain how some norm-like patterns are upheld. But as there are norm-like patterns that depend on what is actually done rather than what is intended or foreseen, it cannot be the whole story.

A further problem—which applies to stealing Gilbert’s and Scanlon’s ideas alike—is that those authors are both attempting to ground or identify genuine norms. These are norms that the agents concerned would, on reflection, agree with; or at least they would not, with full knowledge and understanding, reject them. This is a problem because, as mentioned earlier, the principles to which norm-like patterns conform need not be true, nor would the agents necessarily endorse them. And they may not be currently appropriate. To illustrate: effort-matching occurs even when it reduces performance; and people may uphold norm-like patterns involving food (cannibalism, for example) and and sex (incest, for example) while rejecting the principles to which the patterns conform.

Inspiration: Bitterness

Fast processes are involved in helping animals avoid eating poisons. Poisonous foods often trigger bitter sensations, which are aversive.^[2] This enables the animal to learn to avoid those foods.^[3]

Although there is broad consensus that avoiding poisons is one of the functions of sensitivity to bitterness,^[4] the correlation between bitterness and toxicity is not super strong (Nissim, Dagan-Wiener, & Niv, 2017). Bitter things can be beneficial (such as caffeine, for example). Indeed, as well as indicating toxicity, bitterness is also associated with medicinal properties. Nissim et al. (2017) suggest that animals may exploit this association by eating bitter substances when ill. To illustrate, chimpanzees suffering from diarrhea and other symptoms of parasite infection extract and chew an extremely bitter pith, which appears to improve their health (Huffman, 2001, p. 939).

The case of bitterness illustrates the role of helpful principles in characterising fast process. In this case, the helpful principle is: do not eat poisons. Relating the fast process to the helpful principle enables us to understand why the fast process exists. Importantly, the helpful principle need not match what is good or the useful; nor need it be a principle that agents would endorse, or follow, in full knowledge and understanding. Note also that the fast process need not involve any representation of the helpful principle (nor, as far as we can see, of any principles).

If there were a social equivalent of bitterness, namely a sensational response to socially toxic events, then that would likely explain norm-like patterns. This is probably too much to ask for.^[5] But perhaps we can exploit research in moral psychology that comes close to this idea.

A Dual-process Theory

Conjecture:

Norm-like patterns are a consequence of fast moral processes, which produce behaviours in conformity with helpful principles.^[6]

The helpful principles may be false, and those whose actions manifest the norm-like patterns may know this.

The fast processes need not involve any representation of the helpful principles (nor any representations at all).

We are not committed to the idea that fast moral processes are the only source of norm-like patterns, just that they are one source.^[7]

Predictions:

1. Norm-like patterns will dissociate from normative judgements.
2. Increasing cognitive load will enhance norm-like patterns.
3. Disgust and bitterness will modulate judgements following observation of violation of norm-like patterns.

Glossary

References

Endnotes