Mindreading as Asynchronous Coordination
If the slides are not working, or you prefer them full screen, please try this link.
Notes
Source
This section is based on Apperly et al. (2026)
Limits of Mindreading-as-Coordination
Normativity
Attributions of agency and mental states are can be criticised and corrected. ‘I did mean to do it’ is sometimes acceptable, but in some cases saying that incurs additional criticisms.
Norms of attribution are perhaps easier to see in groups that have standards unlike any we are familiar with. Schieffelin (2008) reports a taboo on attributing mental states to others among the Bosavi in Papua New Guinea. Violating this norm can result in social sanction. Children are brought up to follow the standard:
‘While children are encouraged to verbalize their own desires and intentions, they are explicitly socialized not to verbally guess at or express others’ unvoiced intentions and unclear meanings’ (Schieffelin, 2008).
Stability
Mindreading standards can be shared by large groups. One-off deviant attributions rarely if ever seem to change the standards.
Unknown Standards
Mindreaders probably do not know the mindreading standards, and may have false beliefs about them.