Intro

Pacherie’s Two Problems

‘in order to account for the connection between prior intentions and intentions in action [=motor representations]^[1], it is necessary to explain how a subject can possess action concepts and how, when a prior intention causes an intention in action, the conceptual content of the prior intention can be converted into the non-conceptual content of an intention in action.’ (Pacherie, 2000, p. 423)

Interface Problems

Where two kinds of representation have contents that can match (or not), and where those representations are not inferentially integrated, but the representations do sometimes non-accidentally match: How is the non-accidental matching possible?^[2]

Matching

‘Two collections of outcomes, A and B, match in a particular context just if, in that context, either the occurrence of the A-outcomes would normally constitute or cause, at least partially, the occurrence of the B-outcomes or vice versa.’ (Butterfill & Sinigaglia, 2014, p. 131)

Inferential Integration

As I will use the term, for kinds of state to be inferentially integrated means that in the absence of obstacles such as time pressure, distraction, motivations to be irrational, self-deception or exhaustion, any states of these kinds can jointly feature in a single process of inference or practical reasoning in such a way that arbitrary rational relations between their contents appropriately influence how the process unfolds.^[3]

The Interface Problem Isn’t a Problem

‘We should dissolve, not solve, the interface problem.’ (Burnston, 2017, p. 248)

‘recent evidence indicates that the ‘broad brushstrokes’ view of the interface is not correct, and this evidence also contradicts several of Butterfill & Sinigaglia’s assumptions. This requires us to reformulate the problem and raises questions about existing solutions.’ (Christensen, 2021, p. 548)

‘the approach set out below works by dissolving the problem rather than solving it. There is in fact no mismatch of formats between intention and motor representations that needs to be reconciled or aligned.’ (Levy, 2025, p. 9)

‘I want to embrace and assert the claim that concepts serve as an interface but to cancel the implication that there is an interface problem.’ (Shea, 2025, p. §Motivations)

Selected Objections to Reference by Deference

Awareness:

‘In general, demonstratives require a perceptual-attentional link to their referents [...] whatever states one attends to or perceives must be ones that one is capable of being aware of in some way, and motor representations do not meet this criterion. They are subpersonal states that are inaccessible to awareness’ (Mylopoulos & Pacherie, 2016, p. 327)

But also:

‘motor representations affect the content and subjective character of experiences of acting, and in that way might be indirectly accessed.’ (Mylopoulos & Pacherie, 2019, p. §3)

Misfire

‘it is unclear what it would be for such a demonstrative to misfire, i.e., to “point” to the wrong motor representation, as there is of course no actual pointing gesture taking place’ (Mylopoulos & Pacherie, 2016, p. 328)

Selection

‘the agent must have an independent grasp of which motor representation is the appropriate one to select via such deferral. But this would require a way of translating between the intention and the motor representation’ (Mylopoulos & Pacherie, 2016, p. 328)

‘The charge is that the notion of demonstrative deferral at issue smuggles in something Butterfill and Sinigaglia do not explain: how the intention manages to defer to the right motor representation without any translation process.’ (Shepherd, 2019, p. §2)

‘as several writers have pointed out, B&S’ solution seems implicitly to do just that [...] For, absent some process of translation, it is unclear how the deferred reference they postulate could ever get off the ground.’ (Levy, 2025, p. §2.3)

Executable Action Concepts

‘These concepts allow us to activate appropriate motor representations, in part because they are formed on the basis of such representations [...] We call these executable action concepts (Pacherie 2011). If one has an executable action concept, then one has the ability to perform the action in question.’ (Mylopoulos & Pacherie, 2016, p. 334)

‘We can further add that the deployment of an [executable action concept] in the content of an intention serves as a pointer to a specific location in [long-term memory], where appropriate motor schemas for implementing the corresponding action type are stored.’ (Mylopoulos, 2022, p. 288)

Objections

‘one wants to know more about the relationship between the action concept and the motor schema. How does the deployment of an action concept link up with a motor schema? [...] But this is just the joint that generated the interface problem.’ (Shepherd, 2019, p. 290)

‘M&P’s proposed solution falls prey to essentially the same flaw they (correctly) identify in B&S’ proposal – viz., that of presupposing that some mechanism for translating between propositionally and motorically formatted content is in place, instead of explaining how it operates.’ (Levy, 2025, p. §2.3)

‘First, although it is suggested that executable action concepts are those that ‘hook up’ with corresponding MRs, is not clear how this ‘hooking up’ is realized. Second, although it is said that these concepts allow us to activate appropriate motor representations, it is unclear how this is possible without a translation.’ (Ferretti & Caiani, 2019, p. 307)

Pacherie on Demonstrative Action Concepts

‘basic action concepts are demonstrative concepts. To have the concept of a basic action is to have a concept of acting ‘thus’, where ‘thus’ denotes a property made accessible to the agent by the motor representations he is able to form.’ (Pacherie, 2000, p. 425)

‘if the conscious motor image gives us access to the content of higher-level motor representation [...] mastery of such concepts requires that they be anchored in the content of motor images, and that a subject should not be granted possession of such concepts unless he has motor image’ (Pacherie, 2000, p. 425)

‘Some aspects of the operation of the motor system that generate motor representations appear to be consciously accessible. They are reflected in conscious motor imagery and provide the anchoring ground for executable concepts of types of movement.’ (Pacherie, 2011, p. 72)

What do motor representations make accessible?

Contrast:

‘Phonological awareness refers to one’s degree of sensitivity to the sound structure of oral language.’ (Anthony & Francis, 2005, p. 255)

with (same article):

‘phonemes do not have physical reality independent of each other. That is, phonemes produced in speech are acoustically inseparable because adjacent phonemes are coarticulated.’ (Anthony & Francis, 2005, p. 257)

background:

‘the segmentation of the acoustic signal does not correspond directly or in any easily determined way to the segmentation at the phonemic level. [...] In bat, for example, the initial and final consonants are, in the conversion to sound, folded into the medial vowel, with the result that information about successive segments is transmitted more or less simultaneously on the same parts of the sound [...] There is, then, no acoustic criterion by which one can segment the sound into its constituent phonemes.’ (I. Y. Liberman et al., 1974, pp. 203–4)